Privy Purses-II
“You could write a book on how to ruin someone’s day” — Taylor Swift (Tell me why)
Note- Refer to the piece titled “Privy Purses-I” to get the backdrop of this piece.
The new Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi was determined to abolish Privy Purses. In 1967, the All-India Congress Committee passed a resolution to that effect. Part of this determination was fuelled by the fact that the principal opposition to the Congress was the Swatantra Party headed by the same former governor-general Rajaji had many of the former princes who used the privy purses to fund political activity of the party. The Government of India wanted to hold negotiated settlement on the basis of which this abolition was to take place. The Concord of Princes however, refused rightfully fearing that any new promises would again not be kept.
Mrs. Gandhi’s government- in no mood to relent, introduced the 24th Constitutional Amendment in 1970 to delete the two Constitutional Provisions that recognised Privy Purses. The purpose given for the amendment was an ostensible ‘to build an egalitarian social order’ without giving any further reasons as to how this would be achieved by breaking a guarantee.
The bill passed in the Lok Sabha with a healthy majority (332:154) but could not muster the 2/3rd majority in the Rajya Sabha (149:75). Having abandoned all sense of propriety, the cabinet met that very night and it was decided to ‘advise’ the President to withdraw recognition of the princes through a Presidential order. This, essentially is impropriety at its peak. Having failed to achieve the unjust ends of abolishing Privy Purses by use of Parliamentary process, the government of the day simply decided to de-recognise the princes. This meant that princes of kingdoms would still be entitled to privy purses but the people who were princes themselves were not to be recognised as princes. What could not be done democratically was sought to be done by a rubber stamp from the President. The President signed the orders, sent to him on a special aircraft as he was on a visit to Hyderabad- by midnight, the President signed these orders. As an example, the orders to the Maharaja of Gwalior reads as- “In exercise of the powers vested in him under Article 366(22) of the Constitution, the President hereby directs that ith effect from the date of this order His Highness Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Bahadur do cease to be recognised as the Ruler of Gwalior.” Similar orders were issued to other rulers the following day.
The Article as reproduced reads as-
(22) Ruler means the Prince, Chief or other person who, at any time before the commencement of the Constitution was recognised by the President as the Ruler of an Indian State or any person who, at any time before such commencement, was recognised by the President as the successor of such Ruler;
Whereas the Articles guaranteeing Privy Purses read-
Art. 291. Where under any covenant or agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian State before the commencement of this Constitution the payment of any sums, free of tax, has been guaranteed or assured b; the Government of the Dominion of India to any Ruler of such State as privy purse-
(a) such sums shall be charged on, and paid out of, the Consolidated Fund of India; and
(b) the sums so paid to any Ruler shall be exempt from all taxes on income.
Art. 362. In the exercise of the power of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State to make laws, or in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in article 291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State.
The Challenge
Madhav Rao Scindia (who later went on to join the Congress and become a minister) along with several other erstwhile princes challenged this in the Supreme Court.
Several strong arguments were put forward by his counsel Mr. Nanabhoy Palkhivala. Key among them were the contentions that rulership itself amounted to property and the de-recognition amounted to an unjust deprivation of life, property and personal liberty.
The Presidential order was primarily challenged. Full use of the failed attempt at amendment was made. The persistence of the Articles that Constitutionally guaranteed the payment continued the obligation of the Government to pay the princes and recognise their privileges. This was the precise reason why the money was to be paid directly from the Consolidated Fund of India which even barred Parliament from voting on them. Though the fixation of the Privy Purses and the recognition of the princes were historical facts, as they were guaranteed by the Constitution, their discharge was also meant to happen following Constitutional provisions. In short, the Cabinet could not, through something as indirect as a Presidential Order withdraw recognition to the rulers and avoid fulfilling obligations that it is Constitutionally bound by. Allowing this order to stand would mean that the government of the day could, through the President subvert the democratic institution of Parliament to render Constitutional guarantees meaningless.
The Attorney General Niren De used the language of Art. 366(22) to say that the President was simply empowered to de recognise any ruler as he pleases. This was countered with the assertion that the purpose of Art. 366(22) was meant to be exercised in recognising a ruler at a time or to withdraw such recognition and instead name his successor for cogent and valid reasons (incapacity or illness etc.) and not for withdrawal of recognition for all rulers at once simply because Privy Purses were considered an anachronism and that State Policy for some ‘arbitrary’ reason considered this outmoded.
The abuse of the Constitution by reframing it as a policy document and mis-usage of the Provisions within to promote what was considered ‘state policy’ (jargon for party policy) over Constitutional guarantees was rightly condemned. While at first glance the Article may look like it places arbitrary powers at the hands of the President (the Union Cabinet), in reality, this along with several other Provisions also imposed a duty on the President to exercise his powers without eroding Constitutional guarantees. The basic issue then became whether the Executive could flout the Constitutional mandate and render parts of it ineffective by similar orders even if the cause may be a popular cause. The damning example of the Weimar Republic was bought up even in the Supreme Court judgement where it was observed that allowing disrespect to the Constitution in this manner was bound to be replicated for several other matters- essentially cause a cascade of contempt for Constitutional protections including those that protect our Fundamental Rights which would erode our cherished freedoms.
The morning after
The Supreme Court, in a 7:2 majority, held the Presidential Order unconstitutional and rendered it ineffective.
Commenting on this, the great C. Rajagopalachari said that “The Supreme Court has justified its existence. It has upheld India’s honour. It has justified the people’s confidence in it as a bulwark for justice and democracy against authoritarianism”
The story however, does not end here. The Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi finding that her vision policies could not be implemented, decided to call for fresh elections in 1971. In her vision for the creation of the abstract ‘just social order’, she marketed the Supreme Court as a fundamentally undemocratic group of elite people who are interested only in maintaining the current social order and do not want the people of India to live in prosperity under socialist principles. The Congress triumphantly won the 1971 elections with 350 seats and thus began the ‘creation of a new egalitarian social order’. The great majority in both houses of Parliament and the states enabled her to finally abolish the Privy Purses. The 26th Amendment bill simply deleted the two Articles that guaranteed it and Art. 363A was inserted which declared that privy purses stand abolished and no amount of money was to be paid towards Privy Purses. The statement of objects and reasons read as-
“The concept of rulership, with privy purses and special privileges unrelated to any current functions and social purposes, is incompatible with an egalitarian social order. Government have, therefore, decided to terminate the privy purses and privileges of the Rulers of former Indian States. It is necessary for this purpose, apart from amending the relevant provisions of the Constitution, to insert a new article therein so as to terminate expressly the recognition already granted to such Rulers and to abolish privy purses and extinguish all rights, liabilities and obligations in respect of privy purses. Hence this Bill.”
This was interestingly, signed not by the Law Minister, but by Mrs. Indira Gandhi herself.
Conclusion
Parliament was entirely competent, in exercise of its powers to amend the Constitution to delete these provisions. However, it is the author’s opinion that doing so was a dishonourable exercise of this power. Make no mistake, this was an exercise of pure optics, meant to appease the masses and get the Prime Minister's political clout at the altar of the value of a Constitutional promise made by India. Even if these former rulers were absolutely reprehensible, extremely privileged and were rulers only because of their birth and not by virtue, Privy Purses were a solemn guarantee on the basis of which, they gave up all they had. India could not have achieved unification without this guarantee except by use of force (which India did not possess then). No government in a civilised democracy should go back on Constitutional promises made and that too for the paltry sum of 4 crore rupees which achieved a unified India. This was wholly unnecessary too as the amount would have simply dwindled with time and as Granville Austin notes, Privy Purses would have simply been restricted to a footnote in Indian history had Mrs. Gandhi not used their abolition as a political ploy with the objective of ‘socio-economic justice’. Thus, an unnecessary goal was sought to be achieved through illegitimate means, failing which, the general public was misled into believing that the goal were in fact necessary and their abstract progress was hampered because certain obstacles prevented them from achieving those fundamentally unjustified goals. The honour of the Indian union thus suffered a heavy blow.
