What are you voting for?
A certain narrative emerges from the shadows every election cycle that the reader may have taken note of. It is a plea to ‘vote for the candidate’ of their constituency- imploring the noble listener to ‘rise above’ party manifestos, preferences, or visions they may prefer- dismissing it as ‘petty party politics’ and vote for the Member of Parliament (MP) or Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) that their conscience dictates is a better representative by sheer virtue of presumed personal honour and social standing.
While the intention of such appeals may be noble and the alliteration makes the plea more alluring, it is in the author’s opinion based on an extremely flawed and sometimes pernicious understanding. The author concedes, however, that this idea prevails triumphantly in Parliamentary systems like the United Kingdom where a strong dissent against party leadership by a ‘backbench’ MP is a credible way to gain traction. It is even better received in a Presidential system like the United States where ‘bipartisanship’ or representation of the people by a Congressional representative often warrants re-election and adulation. These models form the bulk of the discourse that inspires the appeals mentioned above. It is thus, important to understand why the Indian system differs.
When the Indian democratic system was established, the Lok Sabha and the State Legislative Assemblies (Vidhan Sabha) functioned more or less like the British House of Commons. The people of a constituency voted for their representative among a slew of candidates who were either fielded by political parties or were reputable independent members. It is important to note here, that while parties even then had strong leaderships, dissenting views by junior members did not mean expulsion from the party- simply because parties themselves were so factionalised and democratic that every shade of opinion would find protection by a prominent leader. While prominent mass leaders may have differed fundamentally, the fact that the system was as democratic-regular party elections, non-suppression of views (not out of benevolence but out of fear that splits from the party would cause loss of political power) and a democratic ticket distribution exercise among other things, the system mirrored British Parliament. Dissent bordering on mockery had to be accepted by the party leadership. In the Winter Session of 1961, months before the Indo-China War, Pandit Nehru in Parliament commented on Aksai Chin describing it as a barren, useless land where no people, livestock, trees or animals inhabit using the visually arresting quip- ‘not a blade of grass grows there’ to which Mahavir Tyagi of the same Indian National Congress rose from his seat, removed his own cap to reveal a shining bald head and sharply stated that no hair grows on his head either then rhetorically asking his Prime Minister if he intends to gift his head along with the territory to China. Ideological factions as this existing within parties offered teeth to criticism from the opposition- the ultimate disapproval of leadership- voting against a bill or a resolution proposed by a member of the same party existed as ammunition. No government could thus legislate without either internal consensus or broad agreement from the house- hammering the point of a deliberative democracy which primarily kept authoritarianism at bay.
Imperfect as though it may have been, what replaced this playing field of ideas plagues us to this day. Defections were a problem in India- members after winning an election from one party ticket would soon change political parties after elections due to many ideological or financial incentives- the promise of a cabinet position by the other party is indeed alluring. This phenomenon was referred to commonly as the ‘Aya Ram Gaya Ram’ a reference made to a Haryana MLA Gaya Lal- a man who changed his political affiliations three times on the same uneventful day of 1967. Defections had become commonplace in Indian politics- a bribe, a promise, or to the virtuous- a promise to implement their vision for the country. These defections would result in unstable governments, unfulfilled promises, broken aspirations among several other ill effects of unstable governments. There was general consensus between the people, the Judiciary, successive governments, and even political parties (even ‘winners’ eventually receive the short end of the stick) that this situation threatened the political integrity and legitimacy of the Indian State. It was in this context that the 52nd Amendment to the Constitution was bought by the Rajiv Gandhi government which amended Art. 103 and Art. 191 and inserted the 10th Schedule to the Constitution. Quite simply, it stated that a member of either house of the Union Parliament or the State Assembly could be disqualified from the membership of the House- nulling the choice of the people in a democratic election on the satisfaction of enumerated conditions in the Schedule. The act of expulsion itself says to the electorate that the candidate they had democratically chosen to represent them and their interests was simply ‘not right’ by an internal political standard.
The condition in Paragraph 2(1)(a) states that a member can incur disqualification if he has ‘voluntarily given up membership of his party.’ Benign and reasonable as though it may seem, there has been no threshold determined for what either ‘voluntarily’ or ‘giving up’ means- it cannot be as high as meaning ‘only’ resignation from party as active sabotage is even worse but it cannot mean that dissent against party position and holding public rallies against a party leadership position is a voluntary resignation. Even more terrifying is the judiciary endorsed the idea that a member thrown out of his party for engaging in ‘anti-party’ activities by the party leadership would incur disqualification from the House itself meaning that a party member elected cannot then leave the party and remain an independent representative of the people. The determination of ‘anti-party activity’ is a subjective open-ended exercise that the party leadership does- something India witnessed quite recently when the Rajasthan Chief Minister considered his deputy flying with a few MLAs to complain about the state leadership to the same party’s central leadership as an anti-party activity and moved to have the members expelled from the House. Thus, there is a scope of rank arbitrariness in the system and party leadership- nepotistic and corrupt as though it may be can deny the people of their rightfully elected representative.
Paragraph 2(1)(b) is even worse- it goes on to say that a member of the House shall be expelled from the House if he simply votes contrary to his party directions or even abstains from voting on a particular bill. The member may escape the sanction by obtaining either prior consent or condonation by the party within fifteen days- mainly depending on the party chief’s benevolence. Thus, anything done by a member contrary to a party direction in the discharge of his official duties- that of accurately representing his electorate would render him liable for expulsion. A representative of the people in a constituency is thus made into a party ‘consensus’ representative- his ability to represent the interests of the people in his constituency is severely hampered if the interests do not align with his party agenda. This has created a fundamentally undemocratic system whereas, in a parliamentary system, debate and discussion are important aspects of building consensus and passing legislation that affects the whole country or state, this paragraph has curtailed both.
The Legislative body meant as a primary check on a government has thus been diluted- it is a mere paper tiger now. Theoretically meant to restrain government high handedness, it is now complicit in the most draconian acts done by the government. It is simply impossible to think of a situation where the party in power- the party that enjoys a numerical majority will not issue directions for voting on a piece of legislation. In other words, repulsive as though an MP or an MLA may think a bill is and harmful as though it may be to the people they represent, they mandatorily have to kowtow to their party position publicly for fear of being thought of as indulgent in ‘anti-party activities’ which will be construed as an implied resignation or they express disagreement or vote contrary to directions issued without condonation by those that he opposes and by extension be thrown out of the house.
The adjudication on the question of whether the conditions had been fulfilled would be done by the Speaker of the House- elected by members of the house (usually resulting in a majority party selection as they enjoy numerical strength) and there are rightful problems against the competence of a theoretically neutral but increasingly partisan office of the Speaker itself in neutrally giving a verdict as even the security of his position is contingent on majority support in the House. It is certainly in his interest to remain loyal to the majority that elected him.
There is some respite in Paragraph 4 which saves a member from disqualification in cases of splits or mergers but that is merely accepting for a certain number of people what is deemed as unacceptable and liable for expulsion for one member. The line between a ‘defection’ and a ‘split’ and it may be said that if a group of members engages in an activity that would cause expulsion of an individual member performing the same, either the entire group must be expelled or the activity of the member be non-punishable. These logical lacunas have been raised time and again and only now the High Courts and Supreme Court have taken note of this after brushing it off as ‘frivolous’ for decades.
It must be examined whether these very fundamentally flawed and seemingly stringent provisions have at all succeeded. If one has cursorily browsed through newspapers since 2015, a very problematic trend emerges. Defections have become mainstream political tactics- what used to be a lowly measure looked at with contempt by people is now lauded as a ‘masterstroke’- a smattering of political genius. Members bribed, cases against them withdrawn, members kept ‘securely’ in plush hotels, etc have become symptoms of an impending collapse of a state government. Expulsions are not feared- sometimes members of a party resign from membership of the House, pre-empting the ousting. The numerical exception created under Paragraph 4 allows for blocks of representatives to simply switch allegiances as a block instead of as individuals allowing an escape from the penalty of losing their seat in the House. This allows ‘horse-trading’ in a very organised and professional way- further legitimising the phenomena as a shameful feature of Indian democracy. The very evil that the fundamentally anti-democratic remedy (not mere ‘undemocratic’) sought to cure is not only present, it is thriving and is stronger than ever before.
It may be said that in all of this, the Indian voter is taken for a fool and treated with condescension and is taken for granted- the voter, the common person is the ultimate loser. She is simply not voting for her representative anymore- she is voting for a party representative who is a mere object and has no existence of a political free will and will only represent her party interest in Parliament even when it is to the voter’s ultimate detriment. Concerns raised in party meetings will not find an ear as only the diktats of the party President shall be enforced and will be mandatorily followed in legislative business.
There are Private members’ bills proposed to change the state of affairs which provide a glimmer of hope although no party has endorsed any such bill (and why indeed would they?). The Judiciary has taken note and there are a slew of judgments that question both the competence and neutrality of the Speaker in expulsion matters and the lack of a threshold to determine what an ‘anti-party’ activity is- where such allegation can be challenged and whether a member can vote contrary to directions by the party for issues not mentioned in the election manifesto. Till something concrete emerges that drastically changes this literal ‘scheme’ of things, members voting in a house can simply be replaced by a button at the hands of a party president that transfers the total votes for or against a motion. It is thus the author’s contention that unless an MP or an MLA proposes with details their plans to infrastructurally improve their local area using the Local Area Development funds, the voter must not in their interest vote for them. Party vision and manifesto are the only things to reasonably consider- simply put- your representative is not your representative, ignore the fervent appeals to ‘vote for your candidate’ unless you are promised full transparency and measurable infrastructural development.
